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A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF THE
STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING




In recent years, there has been much discussion of the need to
refine and update the criteria for determining that a human being has
died.1 In light of medicine's increasing ability to maintain certain signs
of life artificially2 and to make good use of organs from newly dead
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I See, e.g., P. RAMUSEY, TM PATIENT AS PRsoN 59-112 (1970); Louisell, Transplanta-
tion: Existing Legal Constraints, in ETHcs IN MEDICAL PROoESS: Wzm33 SPECAL Rxra-
ENCE To TnS.AxPLAOTATioN 91-92 (G. Wolstenholme & M. O'Connor eds. 1966) [herein-
after cited as MEDICAL PROGRESS]; Discussion of Murray, Organ Transplantation: The
Practical Possibilities, in id. 68 (comments of Dr. G. E. Schreiner), 71 (comments of
Dr. M. F. A. Woodruff); Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human
Organ Transplantation, 14 CrEv.-Maa. L. Rv. 442 (1965); Beecher, Ethical Problems
Created by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278 NEw ENG. J. MA. 1425 (1968);
Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 011o ST. L.J. 32 (1969); Note, The Need for a
Redefinition of "Death," 45 CHi.-KxNT L. REv. 202 (1969).
2 A dramatic increase over the past twenty years in the use of extraordinary means
of support such as artificial respirators for terminal patients is generally assumed by
physicians, on the basis of observational and anecdotal evidence, but no quantitative
studies of this phenomenon have been done. Telephone interview with Dr. Claude
L'Enfant, Director, Division of Lung Diseases, National Heart and Lung Institute, Be-
thesda, Md., Oct. 16, 1972. For this reason it is not possible to offer any detailed estimate
of the impact that the proposed statute, see text accompanying note 86 infra, would have
on the resources allocated to patient care.
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bodies, new criteria of death have been proposed by medical authori-
ties.8 Several states have enacted or are considering legislation to
establish a statutory "definition of death,"4 at the prompting of some
members of the medical profession who apparently feel that existing,
judicially-framed standards might expose physicians, particularly
transplant surgeons, to civil or criminal liability. Although the leading
statute in this area0 appears to create more problems than it resolves,7
some legislation may be needed for the protection of the public as well
as the medical profession, and, in any event, many more states will
probably be enacting such statutes in the near future.8
3 See, e.g., Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JA.A. 337 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Irreversible Coma]; Discussion of Murray, Organ Transplantation:
The Practical Possibilities, in MEDiCAL PROGREsS, supra note 1, at 69-74 (remarks of
Drs. G. P. J. Alexandre, R. Y. Calne, J. Hamburger, J. E. Murray, J. P. Revillard &
G. E. Schreiner); When Is a Patient Dead?, 204 J.AM.A. 1000 (1968) (editorial);
Updating the Definition of Death, MED. WoarsD NEWS, Apr. 28, 1967, at 47.
In an earlier article, our Research Group appraised the proposed new medical criteria
for the determination of death and discussed some of the sources of public concern.
Task Force on Death and Dying, Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences,
Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death: An Appraisal, 221 J.A.MA.
48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Refinements in Criteria]. In discussing the procedures
used to establish the new criteria, the article concluded:
Clearly, these matters of decisionmaking and the role of law need further
and widespread discussion. The acceptability of any new concept or criteria
of death will depend at least as much on the acceptability of the procedure
by which they are adopted as on their actual content.
Id. 53.
4
KAN. STAT. AxN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971); MAARYi-AN SEsxoNs LAWS ch. 693 (1972).
Bills are presently pending in Florida, H. 551, 2d Fla. Legis. (n.s.) (1971), Illinois, H.
1586, 77th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (1971), and Wisconsin, S. 550, Biennial Sess. (1971).
Section IV of this Article argues that terms such as "defining death" and "definition
of death" are extremely ambiguous, and that the ambiguity is an important cause of
misunderstanding and confusion regarding the propriety of legislation in this area. Though
it would be desirable not to use such terms, they are too well established in professional
and public discourse on these matters to be eliminated. For convenience, and often
deliberately to emphasize the problem of ambiguity, we occasionally use these terms in
quotation marks. For an explanation of four different levels of specificity which may be
intended when the term "definition of death" is employed, see notes 57-60 infra &
accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Taylor, A Statutory Definition of Death in Kansas, 215 J.A.MA. 296
(1971) (letter to the editor), in which the principal draftsman of the Kansas statute
states that the law was believed necessary to protect transplant surgeons against the
risk of "a criminal charge, for the existence of a resuscitated heart in another body
should be excellent evidence that the donor was not dead [under the "definition" of death
then existing in Kansas] until the operator excised the heart." Cf. Kapoor, Death &
Problems of Transplant, 38 MAx. B. Naws 167, 177 (1971); Baker, Liability and the
Heart Transplant, 6 HoUsToN L. Rav. 85, 97-101 (1968). The specter of civil liability
was raised in Tucker v. Lower, a recent action brought by the brother of a heart
donor against the transplantation team at the Medical College of Virginia. See notes
42-50 infra & accompanying text.
6 Kan. STAT. Anw. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971); see notes 74-88, 98-101 infra & ac-
companying text for a discussion of this statute.
7 See notes 74-85 infra & accompanying text.
8 In addition to the state medical societies, see Taylor, supra note 5, others have
advocated a statutory definition of death. "Medical researchers and M.D.'s involved in
transplants must break with their traditional reluctance to seek statutory changes in the
definition of death or find themselves floundering in a morass of court suits in coming
years." 15 DRUG RESEARCHr REP., June 7, 1972, at 1. Moreover, once a statute is enacted
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I. BACKGROUND
Courts and physicians can no longer assume that determining
whether and when a person has died is always a relatively simple
matter. The development and use of sophisticated machinery to main-
tain artificially both respiration and circulation has introduced difficul-
ties in making this determination in some instances. In such cases, the
use of a cardiac pacemaker or a mechanical respirator renders doubt-
ful the significance of the traditional "vital signs" of pulse, heartbeat,
and respiratory movements as indicators of continuing life. Similarly,
the ability of an organ recipient to go on living after his own heart
has been removed and replaced by another's has further undermined
the status of the beating heart as one of the most reliable-if not the
most reliable--signs that a person is still alive. In addition, the need of
transplant surgeons to obtain organs in good condition from cadavers
has stimulated the search for tests that would permit the death of the
organism as a whole to be declared before the constituent organs have
suffered extensive deterioration. Consequently, new criteria for judging
a person dead have been proposed and are gaining acceptance among
physicians. The most prominent are those formulated in 1968 by the
Harvard Medical School's Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Defini-
tion of Brain Death, chaired by Dr. Henry K. Beecher.9
The Harvard Committee described in considerable detail three
criteria of "irreversible coma": (1) "unreceptivity and unresponsiv-
ity" to "externally applied stimuli and inner need"; (2) absence of
spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous respiration; and (3)
no elicitable reflexes.Y0 In addition, a flat (isoelectric) electroenceph-
alogram was held to be "of great confirmatory value" for the clini-
cal diagnosis." Although generally referred to as criteria for "cerebral
on a new subject in one state, there seem to be direct and indirect pressures for it to
be viewed as a model for adoption in other states. Cf. id. 5, which notes that the
Virginia statute allowing a medical examiner to provide a decedent's organs for trans-
plantation is "the first of its kind in the nation" and terms it "a model for other states
to emulate," when it is in fact poorly conceived and nearly incomprehensible.
9 See Irreversible Coma, supra note 3. In addition to Dr. Beecher, the committee
consisted of nine other physicians, an historian, a lawyer, and a theologian, all Harvard
University faculty members. Id.
10 Id. 337-38.
'lThe Harvard committee spelled out its central conclusions as follows:
An organ, brain or other, that no longer functions and has no possibility of
functioning again is for all practical purposes dead. Our first problem is to
determine the characteristics of a permanently nonfunctioning brain.
A patient in this state appears to be in deep coma. The condition can be
satisfactorily diagnosed by points 1, 2, and 3 to follow. The electroencephalogram
(point 4) provides confirmatory data, and when available it should be utilized.
In situations where for one reason or another electroencephalographic monitoring
is not available, the absence of cerebral function has to be determined by purely
clinical signs, to be described, or by absence of circulation as judged by stand-
still of blood in the retinal vessels, or by absence of cardiac activity.
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death" or "brain death," these criteria assess not only higher brain
functions but brainstem and spinal cord activity and spontaneous
respiration as well. The accumulating scientific evidence indicates that
patients who meet the Harvard criteria will not recover and on
autopsy will be found to have brains which are obviously destroyed,12
1. Unreceptivity and Unresponsitiviy.-There is a total unawareness to
externally applied stimuli and inner need and complete unresponsiveness--our
definition of irreversible coma. Even the most intensely painful stimuli evoke
no vocal or other response, not even a groan, withdrawal of a limb, or quickening
of respiration.
2. No Movements or Breathing.-Observations covering a period of at least
one hour by physicians is [sic] adequate to satisfy the criteria of no spontaneous
muscular movements or spontaneous respiration or response to stimuli such as
pain, touch, sound, or light. After the patient is on a mechanical respirator,
the total absence of spontaneous breathing may be established by turning off
the respirator for three minutes and observing whether there is any effort on the
part of the subject to breathe spontaneously. (The respirator may be turned
off for this time provided that at the start of the trial period the patient's
carbon dioxide tension is within the normal range, and provided also that the
patient has been breathing room air for at least 10 minutes prior to the trial.)
3. No reflexes.-Irreversible coma with abolition of central nervous system
activity is evidenced in part by the absence of elicitable reflexes. The pupil will
be fixed and dilated and will not respond to a direct source of bright light.
Since the establishment of a fixed, dilated pupil is clear-cut in clinical practice,
there should be no uncertainty as to its presence. Ocular movement (to head
turning and to irrigation of the ears with ice water) and blinking are absent.
There is no evidence of postural activity (decerebrate or other). Swallowing,
yawning, vocalization are in abeyance. Corneal and pharyngeal reflexes are
absent.
As a rule the stretch of tendon reflexes cannot be elicited; i.e., tapping the
tendons of the biceps, triceps, and pronator muscles, quadriceps and gastrocnemius
muscles with the reflex hammer elicits no contraction of the respective muscles.
Plantar or noxious stimulation gives no response.
4. Flat Electroencephalogram.--Of great confirmatory value is the flat or
isoelectric EEG. We must assume that the electrodes have been properly ap-
plied, that the apparatus is functioning normally, and that the personnel in
charge is competent. We consider it prudent to have one channel of the apparatus
used for an electrocardiogram. This channel will monitor the ECG so that, if
it appears in the electroencephalographic leads because of high resistance, it
can be readily identified. It also establishes the presence of the active heart in
the absence of the EEG. We recommend that another channel be used for a
noncephalic lead. This will pick up space-borne or vibration-borne artifacts and
identify them. The simplest form of such a monitoring noncephalic electrode
has two leads over the dorsum of the hand, preferably the right hand, so the
ECG will be minimal or absent. Since one of the requirements of this state is that
there be no muscle activity, these two dorsal hand electrodes will not be bothered
by muscle artifact. The apparatus should be run at standard gains 10/tv/mm,
501pv/5 mm. Also it should be isoelectric at double this standard gain which is
5k4v/mm or 25juv/5 mm. At least ten full minutes of recording are desirable,
but twice that would be better.
It is also suggested that the gains at some point be opened to their full
amplitude for a brief period (5 to 100 seconds) to see what is going on. Usually
in an intensive care unit artifacts will dominate the picture, but these are readily
identifiable. There shall be no electroencephalographic response to noise or to
pinch.
All of the above tests shall be repeated at least 24 hours later with no
change.
The validity of such data as indications of irreversible cerebral damage
depends on the exclusion of two conditions: hypothermia (temperature below
90 F. [32.2 C.l) or central nervous system depressants, such as barbiturates.
Irreversible Coma, supra note 3, at 337-38.
12 In the largest single study of patients with flat E.E.G.'s of twenty-four hours'
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and supports the conclusion that these criteria may be useful for
determining that death has occurred. The Harvard Committee's views
were apparently well received in the medical community."3 Not all
physicians have been enthusiastic, however. Professor David Rutstein
of the Harvard Medical School, for example, expressed concern over
"this major ethical change [which] has occurred right before our eyes
... with little public discussion of its significance.'
14
Not surprisingly, disquiet over the change in medical attitude and
practice arose in lay as well as medical circles.' 5 The prospect of
physicians agreeing amongst themselves to change the rules by which
life is measured in order to salvage a larger number of transplantable
organs met with something short of universal approval.16 Especially
with increasing disenchantment over heart transplantation (the pro-
cedure in which the traditional criteria for determining death posed
the most difficulties), some doubt arose whether it was wise to adopt
measures which encouraged a medical "advance" that seemed to have
gotten ahead of its own basic technology. Furthermore, many people
-doctors included-found themselves with nagging if often unarti-
culated doubts about how to proceed in the situation, far more com-
duration, which involved 2639 comatose patients without anesthetic doses of c.n.s. de-
pressants, not one recovered. Silverman, Masland, Saunders & Schwab, Irreversible Coma
Associated with Electrocerebral Silence, 20 NEURoLoGY 525 (1970). In an unreported
study on 128 individuals who fulfilled the Harvard clinical criteria, postmortem examina-
tions showed their brains to be destroyed. Unpublished results of E. Richardson, reported
in Refinements in Criteria, supra note 3, at 50-51.
13 One member of the committee has observed that "since the publication of the
report, the clinical recommendations have been accepted and followed on a worldwide
basis in a most gratifying fashion." Curran, Legal and Medical Death-Kansas Takes
the First Step, 284 Nnw ENG. 3. MAID. 260 (1971). Dr. Beecher recently noted that
legal doubts have prevented uniform acceptance of the Harvard Committee's views.
"Almost every (doctor) on the East Coast has accepted irreversible brain damage as the
criterion for death, whereas most West Coast physicians do not for fear of suits."
Ross, Death with Dignity, The Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1972, at B-15, col. 1 (quoting
Dr. Beecher) ; for a fuller account of the testimony, see Hearings on Death with Dignity
Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
14 Rutstein, The Ethical Design of Human Experiments, 98 DAEDALus 523, 526
(1969). Leaders of the Netherlands Red Cross Society's Organ Transplantation Committee
argue that only "total absence of the brain's functional capacity" and not "irreversible
coma" indicates that death has occurred and state the Dutch position that the Harvard
criteria "are grounds for stopping treatment and letting the patient die," but not for
declaring death. Rot & van Till, Neocortical Death after Cardiac Arrest, 2 LANCET 1099-
100 (1971) (letter to the editor).
1 5 See, e.g., Arnold, Zimmerman & Martin, Public Attitudes and the Diagnosis of
Death, 206 JAM.A. 1949 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Arnold]; Bi6rck, When is Death?,
1968 Wis. L. REV. 484, 490-91; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1968, at 23, col. 1 (quoting Drs.
F. C. Spencer & J. Hardy); The Heart: Miracle in Cape Town, NEwswEEx, Dec. 18,
1967, at 86-87.
16 [C]ertain actions by transplant surgeons in establishing time of death on
death certificates and hospital records have shaken public confidence. Coroners
have denounced them in the press for signing a death certificate in one county
when the beating heart was removed a day later in a far-off city. The public
wonders what the "item" was that was transplanted across the state line and
later registered as a person in the operating room record.
Corday, Life-Death in Human Transplantation, 55 A.BA.J. 629, 632 (1969).
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mon than transplantation, in which a long-comatose patient shows
every prospect of "living" indefinitely with artificial means of sup-
port. As a result of this growing public and professional concern,
elected officials,' with the encouragement of the medical community, 9
have urged public discussion and action to dispel the apprehension
created by the new medical knowledge and to clarify and reformulate
the law. Some commentators, however, have argued that public bodies
and laymen in general have no role to play in this process of change.2
Issue is therefore joined on at least two points: (1) ought the public
to be involved in "defining" death? and (2) if so, how ought it to be
involved-specifically, ought governmental action, in the form of legis-
lation, be taken?2 '
II. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT OR PROFESSIONAL PREROGATIVE?
In considering the possible need for and the desirability of public
involvement, the central question appears to be to what extent, if at
all, the "defining" of death is a medical matter, properly left to phy-
sicians because it lies within their particular sphere of competence.
The belief that the matter of "defining death" is wholly medical is
frequently expressed, and not only by physicians. 2 Indeed, when a
17 [Mlany people are now maintained in a sort of twilight state by the use of
machines which do the work of their lungs or their heart while they are com-
pletely unconscious .... Many of these people will never resume an independent
existence away from the machines . . . One has to decide therefore when to
switch off the machines, and this question arises quite independently of considera-
tions about transplants.
Discussion of Murray, Organ Transplantation: The Practical Possibilities, in MEDICAL
PROGRESS, supra note 1, at 71 (comments of Dr. M. F. A. Woodruff).
18 See, e.g., Mondale, Health Science and Society, 117 CONG. REc. S3708 (daily ed.
Mar. 24, 1971); H. Res. 2830, 2d Fla. Legis. (ns.) (1971) (resolution introduced by
Rep. Sackett, M.D., to create a commission to study death).
19 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 5, at 296; Arnold, supra note 15, at 1954; Corday,
Definition of Death: A Double Standard, HosPITAL TRIMUNE, May 4, 1970, at s;
Halley & Harvey, On an Interdisciplinary Solution to the Legal-Medical Definitional
Dilemma in Death, 2 INDIANA LEGAL F. 219, 227 (1969).
2 0 See, e.g., Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on Death: An Appraisal, 285 NEw ENG.
. MED. 946 (1971); What and When is Death?, 204 J.AW.MA. 539, 540 (1968) (edi-
torial).
21 To some extent this formulation of the problem is, of course, unrealistic, since
"public action" (i.e., action by an official public body), in the form of a court decision,
can come about at the instance of a private litigant regardless of any policy reasons in
favor of public inaction. Although it may therefore be impossible to avoid creating "law"
on the subject, there might still be no significant public involvement if the courts re-
stricted themselves merely to endorsing conclusions reached by private groups, such as
those representing physicians. Kennedy's support for judicial involvement in "defining"
death seems to operate on that premise. See Kennedy, supra note 20, at 947. See also
note 36 infra & accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 20, at 947; Berman, The Legal Problems of Organ
Transplantation, 13 VILL. L. Rxv. 751, 754 (1968); Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Ad-
vance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv.
357, 409 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Sanders]; NATIONAL CoN.rEaEcE o CoMMAs-
sioNERs ON UNIFoRM: STATE LAWS, HANDBoox AND PROCEEDmNGS oF THE ANNUAL CON-
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question concerning the moment at which a person died has arisen in
litigation, common law courts have generally regarded this as "a ques-
tion of fact" for determination at trial on the basis (partially but not
exclusively) of expert medical testimony.2" Yet the standards which
are applied in arriving at a conclusion, although based on medical
knowledge, are established by the courts "as a matter of law."24
Thus while it is true that the application of particular criteria or
tests to determine the death of an individual may call for the expertise
of a physician, there are other aspects of formulating a "definition" of
death that are not particularly within medical competence. To be sure,
in practice, so long as the standards being employed are stable and
congruent with community opinion about the phenomenon of death,
FERNCE 192 (1968); cf. Sadler, Sadler & Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act:
A Model for Reform, 206 JA.MA. 2501 (1968). The ad hoc Harvard Committee, com-
posed largely of physicians, came to the same conclusion. See Irreversible Coma, supra
note 3, at 339.
2 3 See Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950). In that
appeal, the court was called upon to decide whether the trial judge had erred in holding
inapplicable to the case a provision of the California Probate Code based on the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act which provided for the equal distribution of the property of
two joint tenants "[w~here there is no sufficient evidence that [they] have died other-
wise than simultaneously .... " The court cited the definition in Black's Law Dictionary
that "death is the cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a
total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital
functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc.," and went on to
observe that "death occurs precisely when life ceases and does not occur until the heart
stops beating and respiration ends. Death is not a continuing event and is an event
that takes place at a precise time." Id. at 375, 215 P.2d at 482. It concluded that the
"question of fact" as to which of the two deceased men died first had been correctly
determined by the trial court in light of "sufficient evidence" given by nonmedical
witnesses concerning the appearance of the men on the evening in question.
24Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 587, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958) (quoting 41
Am. Jum. Husbands and Wives § 244 (1938)). The Smiths, a childless couple who by
will had each left his or her estate to the other, were involved in an automobile ac-
cident. Mr. Smith apparently died immediately, but when assistance arrived Mrs. Smith
was unconscious, and she remained so in the hospital for seventeen days. Thereafter,
Mr. Smith's administrator petitioned for the construction of the wills, alleging:
That as a matter of modern medical science, your petitioner . . . will offer
the Court competent proof that the [Smiths] lost their power to will at the
same instant, and that their demise as earthly human beings occurred at the
same time in said automobile accident, neither of them ever regaining any con-
sciousness whatsoever.
Id. at 582, 317 S.W.2d at 277. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the trial court's
dismissal of the petition as a matter of law on the ground that "it would be too much
of a strain on credulity for us to believe any evidence offered to the effect that Mrs.
Smith was dead, scientifically or otherwise, unless the conditions set out in the [Black's
Law Dictionary (4th ed.)] definition existed." Id. at 586-87, 317 S.W.2d at 279. The
court took "judicial notice that one breathing, though unconscious, is not dead," id. at
589, 317 S.W.2d at 281, and concluded that Mrs. Smith's death was therefore not
simultaneous with her husband's.
Cf. In re Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968). Schmidt,
like Thomas and Smith, involved an inheritorship issue under the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act. The court of appeals found that there was sufficient eyewitness testimony
by laymen to support the trial court's conclusion that Mrs. Schmidt survived her
husband by some minutes, and it found no fault in the use of the Black's Law Dictionary
"definition of death" despite the argument that it "is an anachronism in view of the
recent medical developments relating to heart transplants," since there was no evidence
that the deceased were resuscitable. Id. at 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (dictum).
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most people are content to leave the matter in medical hands. 5 But
the underlying extra-medical aspects of the "definition" become visi-
ble, as they have recently, when medicine departs (or appears to de-
part) from the common or traditional understanding of the concept of
death. The formulation of a concept of death is neither simply a tech-
nical matter nor one susceptible of empirical verification. The idea of
death is at least partly a philosophical question, related to such ideas
as "organism," "human," and "living." Physicians qua physicians are
not expert on these philosophical questions, nor are they expert on the
question of which physiological functions decisively identify a "living,
human organism." They, like other scientists, can suggest which "vital
signs" have what significance for which human functions. They may,
for example, show that a person in an irreversible coma exhibits "total
unawareness to externally applied stimuli and inner need and complete
unresponsiveness, ' '26 and they may predict that when tests for this
condition yield the same results over a twenty-four hour period there
is only a very minute chance that the coma will ever be "reversed."'27
Yet the judgment that "total unawareness.., and complete unrespon-
siveness" are the salient characteristics of death, or that a certain level
of risk of error is acceptable, requires more than technical expertise
and goes beyond medical authority, properly understood.
The proposed departure from the traditional standards for deter-
mining death not only calls attention to the extra-medical issues in-
volved, but is itself a source of public confusion and concern. The con-
fusion can perhaps be traced to the fact that the traditional signs of
life (the beating heart and the expanding chest) are manifestly acces-
sible to the senses of the layman, whereas some of the new criteria
require sophisticated intervention to elicit latent signs of life such as
brain reflexes. Furthermore, the new criteria may disturb the layman
by suggesting that these visible and palpable traditional signs, still
useful in most cases, may be deceiving him in cases where supportive
machinery is being used. The anxiety may also be attributable to the
apparent intention behind the "new definition," which is, at least in
part, to facilitate other developments such as the transplantation of
cadaver organs. Such confusion and anxiety about the standards for
determining death can have far-reaching and distressing consequences
for the patient's family, for the physician, for other patients, and for
25 See Arnold, supra note 15, at 1950, in which the public's "nearly complete ac-
ceptance" of professional practice in this century until cardiac transplantation began is
contrasted with the great concern manifested in the 19th century and earlier, before
embalming became routine, largely because of the fear of premature burial.
26 Irreversible Coma, supra note 3, at 337.
27 See note 12 supra.
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the community at large.28 If the uncertainties surrounding the ques-
tion of determining death are to be laid to rest, a clear and acceptable
standard is needed. And if the formulation and adoption of this stan-
dard are not to be abdicated to the medical fraternity under an ex-
panded view of its competence and authority, then the public and its
representatives ought to be involved.29 Even if the medical profession
takes the lead-as indeed it has-in promoting new criteria of death,
members of the public should at least have the opportunity to review,
and either to affirm or reject the standards by which they are to be
pronounced dead.
III. WHAT MANNER OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT?
There are a number of potential means for involving the public
in this process of formulation and review, none of them perfect. The
least ambitious or comprehensive is simply to encourage discussion of
the issues by the lay press, civic groups, and the community at large.
This public consideration might be directed or supported through the
efforts of national organizations such as the American Medical As-
sociation, the National Institutes of Health, or the National Academy
of Sciences. A resolution calling for the establishment of an ad hoc
body to evaluate public attitudes toward the changes wrought by bio-
medical advances has been sponsored by Senator Mondale since 1967
and was adopted by the Senate in December 1971.81 Mondale's pro-
posed National Advisory Commission on Health Science and Society,
2 8 See Sanders, supra note 22, at 407-09; 3 M. Hours & I.H. HAuT, CouRTRoor
Mxicnm §§ 1.02(3)(a)-(g) (1971). As long as the legal standard is ambiguous, the
possibility exists that the processes of criminal, as well as civil, justice will be impeded.
See, e.g., D. MErxs, Tm HummI BODY AND Tn LAW 116-18 (1970) (discussing an un-
reported British case, Regina v. Potter, in which a manslaughter defendant was convicted
of common assault upon proof that surgeons bad removed a kidney from the decedent
while he was being maintained on a respirator and before he had been found to be
"dead"); Trial to Test M.D's Role in Death of Heart Donor, A.M.A. News, Nov. 11,
1968, at 2 (man charged with manslaughter raised as defense surgeons' removal of victim's
heart when he was kept alive by artificial means).
29 Matte, Law, Morals, and Medicine: A Method of Approach to Current Prob-
lems, 13 J. FoR. Sci. 318, 331-32 (1968). See also note 19 supra.
A theoretical risk of illegal conduct exists in the present state of the law.
The law is apparently waiting for a social and theological consensus on this
point [of "defining" death] . . . . The theologians, the philosophers and the
physicians will have to formulate the judgment of propriety here before it is
crystallized into a definite statutory rule.
Discussion of Louisell, Transplantation: Existing Legal Constraints, in M.nicAL PROGaSs,
supra note 1, at 99 (comments of Prof. D. W. Louisell).
ao For example, early in the debate over heart replacement the Board on Medicine
of the National Academy issued a "Statement on Cardiac Transplantation," but addressed
itself primarily to the need for caution in the spread of the operation to medical centers
which were not suited to carrying it out scientifically. 18 NEws REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEmY OF Sc=NcEs 1 (Mar. 1968).
31 SJ. Res. 75, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), in 117 CoNG. Rc. S20,089-93 (daily
ed. Dec. 2, 1971). See also note 18 supra. The joint resolution is now in the House Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce.
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under the direction of a board of fifteen members of the general public
and professionals from "medicine, law, theology, biological science,
physical science, social science, philosophy, humanities, health ad-
ministration, government, and public affairs," would conduct "seminars
and public hearings" as part of its two-year study.3 2 As important as
it is to ventilate the issues, studies and public discussions alone may
not be adequate to the task. They cannot by themselves dispel the
ambiguities which will continue to trouble decisionmakers and the
public in determining whether an artificially-maintained, comatose
((patient" is still alive.
A second alternative, reliance upon the judicial system, goes be-
yond ascertaining popular attitudes and could provide an authoritative
opinion that might offer some guidance for decisionmakers. Reliance
on judge-made law would, however, neither actively involve the public
in the decisionmaking process nor lead to a prompt, clear, and general
"definition." The courts, of course, cannot speak in the abstract pro-
spectively, but must await litigation, which can involve considerable
delay and expense, to the detriment of both the parties and society. A
need to rely on the courts reflects an uncertainty in the law which is
unfortunate in an area where private decisionmakers (physicians)
must act quickly and irrevocably. An ambiguous legal standard en-
dangers the rights-and in some cases the lives-of the participants.
In such circumstances, a person's choice of one course over another
may depend more on his willingness to test his views in court than on
the relative merits of the courses of action 3
Once called upon to "redefine" death-for example, in a suit
brought by a patient's relatives or, perhaps, by a revived "corpse"
against the physician declaring death-the judiciary may be as well
qualified to perform the task as any governmental body. If the issue
could be resolved solely by a process of reasoning and of taking "judi-
cial notice" of widely known and uncontroverted facts, a court could
handle it without difficulty. If, on the other hand, technical expertise is
required problems may arise. Courts operate within a limited compass
-the facts and contentions of a particular case-and with limited
expertise; they have neither the staff nor the authority to investigate
32 S.J. Res. 75, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), in 117 CONG. REc. S20,090 (daily ed. Dec.
2, 1971).
33 For example, suppose that transplant surgeons were willing to employ a neurological
definition of death, although most other physicians continued to use the "traditional"
definition because of the unsettled nature of the law. If (ex hypothesis) those surgeons
were less averse to the risks of testing their position in litigation, because of their
temperament, training, values and commitments, or desire for success, their "courage"
could lead to patients being declared dead prematurely according to the traditional
standard.
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or to conduct hearings in order to explore such issues as public opinion
or the scientific merits of competing "definitions." 34 Consequently, a
judge's decision may be merely a rubberstamping of the opinions
expressed by the medical experts who appear before him. 5 Indeed,
those who believe that the "definition of death" should be left in the
hands of physicians favor the judicial route over the legislative on
the assumption that, in the event of a law suit, the courts will approve
"the consensus view of the medical profession"3 6 in favor of the new
standards. Leaving the task of articulating a new set of standards to
the courts may prove unsatisfactory, however, if one believes, as
suggested previously, that the formulation of such standards, as op-
posed to their application in particular cases, goes beyond the authority
of the medical profession.
37
Uncertainties in the law are, to be sure, inevitable at times and
are often tolerated if they do not involve matters of general applica-
bility or great moment. Yet the question of whether and when a
person is dead plainly seems the sort of issue that cannot escape the
need for legal clarity on these grounds. Therefore, it is not surprising
that although they would be pleased simply to have the courts endorse
their views, members of the medical profession are doubtful that the
judicial mode of lawmaking offers them adequate protection in this
area3 There is currently no way to be certain that a doctor would
not be liable, criminally or civilly, if he ceased treatment of a person
found to be dead according to the Harvard Committee's criteria but
not according to the "complete cessation of all vital functions" test
presently employed by the courts. Although such "definitions" were
adopted in cases involving inheritors' rights and survivorship39 rather
than a doctor's liability for exercising his judgment about when a
person has died, physicians have with good reason felt that this affords
3 4 See, e.g., Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand,
J.), 154 (Frank, 3., dissenting).
3 5 Because of the adversary nature of the judicial process, testimony is usually
restricted to the "two sides" of an issue and may not fairly represent the spectrum of
opinion held by authorities in the field.
36 Kennedy, supra note 20, at 947. Kennedy's reliance on a medical "consensus" has
a number of weaknesses, which he himself seems to acknowledge: (1) there may be
"a wide range of opinions" held by doctors, so that "there need not necessarily be
only one view" on a subject which is supported by the medical community, in part
because (2) the "usual ways" for these matters to be "discussed and debated" are not
very clear or rigorous since (3) the "American medical profession is not all that well
regulated" unlike its British counterpart and (4) is not organized to give "official
approval" to a single position or (5) to give force to its decision, meaning (6) that "the
task will be assumed by some other body, most probably the legislature." Id.
37 Cf. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (en banc)
(Burger, J., concurring in the result) (criticizing psychiatrists' attempt to alter legal
definition of "mental disease").
38 See note 19 supra.
39See notes 23-24 supra; cf. Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952).
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them little assurance that the courts would not rely upon those cases
as precedent ° On the contrary, it is reasonable to expect that the
courts would seek precedent in these circumstances. Adherence to past
decisions is valued because it increases the likelihood that an individual
will be treated fairly and impartially; it also removes the need to
relitigate every issue in every case. Most importantly, courts are not
inclined to depart from existing rules because to do so may upset the
societal assumption that one may take actions, and rely upon the
actions of others, without fear that the ground rules will be changed
retroactively.
4 1
Considerations of precedent as well as other problems with relying
on the judicial formulation of a new definition were made apparent
in Tucker v. Lower,42 the first case to present the question of the
"definition of death" in the context of organ transplantation. Above
all, this case demonstrates the uncertainty that is inherent in the
process of litigation, which "was touch and go for the medical pro-
fession ' 43 as well as the defendants. Tucker involved a $100,000 dam-
age action against Drs. David Hume and Richard Lower and other
defendant doctors on the Medical College of Virginia transplant team,
brought by William E. Tucker, whose brother's heart was removed
on May 25, 1968, in the world's seventeenth human heart transplant.
The plaintiff claimed that the heart was taken without approval of the
next of kin and that the operation was commenced before his brother
had died. On the latter point, William Tucker offered evidence that
his brother was admitted to the hospital with severe head injuries
sustained in a fall and that after a neurological operation he was
placed on a respirator. At the time he was taken to the operating
room to have his organs removed "he maintained vital signs of life,
that is, . . . normal body temperature, normal pulse, normal blood
4 0 See Taylor, supra note 5, at 296. But cf. Kennedy, supra note 20, at 947.
4 1 "[R]ules of law on which men rely in their business dealings should not be changed
in the middle of the game . . ." Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354, 102 N.E.2d 691,
695 (1951). It must be admitted, however, that such principles usually find their
most forceful articulation when the court is about to proceed on the counter-principle
that when necessary the common law will change with the times to achieve justice.
(In Woods, for example, the New York Court of Appeals overruled its prior decision in
Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), in order to permit a child to sue
for prenatal injuries.) Although in this country, at least, strict adherence to precedent
has been less true on the civil side than on the criminal (where the courts hold closer
to the doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege than do English courts), it is probably fair
to state that judges are more likely to depart from precedent in order to create a new
cause of action than they are to reject an existing standard and thereby destroy a cause;
to adjust the "definition of death" to the perhaps changing views of the medical profession
would be to derogate the rights of those litigants injured by declarations of death which
departed from previously accepted standards.
42 Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Richmond, Va., L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972).
48 15 DRuG REsaARcn REP., June 7, 1972, at 1.
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pressure and normal rate of respiration. 44 Based on the neurologist's
finding that the brother was dead from a neurological standpoint, the
respirator was turned off and he was pronounced dead. The defendants
moved to strike the plaintiff's evidence and for summary judgment in
their favor, but the trial judge denied the motions.
The function of This Court is to determine the state of
the law on this or any other subject according to legal prece-
dent and principle. The courts which have had occasion to
rule upon the nature of death and its timing have all decided
that death occurs at a precise time, and that it is defined as
the cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; a total stoppage of
the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal
and vital functions consequent thereto such as respiration and
pulsation.4 5
The court adhered to "the legal concept of death" and rejected
"the invitation offered by the defendants to employ a medical con-
cept of neurological death in establishing a rule of law."46 The court
ruled that the jury would be allowed to assess damages if it concluded
"that the decedent's life was terminated at a time earlier than it would
ordinarily have ended had all reasonable medical efforts been continued
to prolong his life."47
When he sent the case to the jurors, however, the judge permitted
them to consider all possible causes of death, including injury to the
brain as well as cessation of breathing or heartbeat, and a verdict
was returned for the defendants. Unfortunately, the discrepancy
between the initial ruling and the subsequent instructions to the
jury did little to resolve the legal uncertainty. The plaintiff has an-
nounced that he plans to appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
41
and the creation of a clear and binding rule will depend on the action
of that court.49
In declining the defendants' suggestion that he adopt a standard
44 Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831, at 4 (Richmond, Va., L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972).
45 Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
46Id.
While it is recognized that none of the cases cited above involved trans-
plants, to employ a different standard in this field would create chaos in other
fields of the law and certainly it cannot be successfully argued that there should
be one concept of death which applies to one type of litigation while an entirely
different standard applies in other areas.
Id. at 8-9.
471d. at 11.
4 8 N.Y. Times, May 27, 1972, at 15, col. 5; id., June 4, 1972, § 4, at 7, col. 1.
4 9 As one medical journal, which favors legislative formulation of a "definition,"
said of the decision of the Richmond court: "It applies only to cases coming before
that court and can be reversed on appeal or overriden by contrary decisions handed
down in higher courts." 15 DRuo REsEAncH REP., June 7, 1972, at 1.
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based on neurological signs, the judge stated that application for
"such a radical change" in the law should be made "not to the courts
but to the legislature wherein the basic concepts of our society relating
to the preservation and extension of life could be examined and, if
necessary, reevaluated."5 A statutory "definition" of death would have
notable advantages as an alternative to a judicial promulgation. Basi-
cally, the legislative process permits the public to play a more active
role in decisionmaking and allows a wider range of information to enter
into the framing of criteria for determining death. Moreover, by
providing prospective guidance, statutory standards could dispel public
and professional doubt, and could provide needed reassurance for
physicians and patients' families, thereby reducing both the fear and
the likelihood of litigation for malpractice (or even for homicide).
The legislative alternative also has a number of drawbacks,
however. Foremost among these is the danger that a statute "defining"
death may be badly drafted. It may be either too general or too spe-
cific, or it may be so poorly worded that it will leave physicians or
laymen unsure of its intent. There is also the danger that the statutory
language might seem to preclude future refinements that expanding
medical knowledge would introduce into the tests and procedures for
determining death. The problem of bad draftsmanship is compounded
by the fact that a statute once enacted may be difficult to revise or
repeal, leaving to the slow and uncertain process of litigation the
clarification of its intent and meaning.5 By contrast, although judges
usually espouse the doctrine of stare decisis, flexibility over time is a
hallmark of the common law. An additional practical problem is the
possibility that the statutes enacted may reflect primarily the interests
of powerful lobbying groups-for example, state medical societies or
transplant surgeons. This possibility-similar to the danger of judicial
"rubberstamping" of medical experts' opinions-may be avoided by
legislatures' holding open and well-publicized hearings at which so-
ciologists, lawyers, theologians, and representatives of various view-
points are also called upon to testify.
Professor Ian Kennedy has suggested the further danger that a
statutory "definition," rather than protecting the public may leave it
vulnerable to physicians who through "liberal interpretation and clever
argument" might take actions "just within the letter if not the spirit of
the law.' ' 2 Kennedy would rely instead on the medical profession's
50 Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831, at 10 (Richmond, Va., L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972).
51 The general durability of statutes has the backhanded advantage, however, of
emphasizing for the public as well as for legislators the importance of a thorough
thrashing out of the issues in hearings and legislative debates.
52 Kennedy, supra note 20, at 947.
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generalized "consensus view' 5 3 of the proper "definition of death." It
is, however, far from clear why physicians who would violate a statute
are unlikely to depart from such an informal "consensus," which may
or may not eventually be sanctioned by the courts. Legislation will not
remove the need for reasoned interpretation-first by physicians and
perhaps then by judges-but it can restrict the compass within which
they make their choices to one which has been found acceptable by the
public.
Finally, the legislative route may reduce the likelihood that con-
flicting "definitions" of death will be employed in different jurisdictions
in this country. Theoretically, uniformity is also possible in judicial
opinions, but it occurs infrequently. If the formulation and reception
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provide any precedent, the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws appear to be well situated to
provide leadership in achieving an intelligent response to changes in
medical procedure. 54
In sum, then, official action, as opposed to mere discussion of the
issues, is needed if the conflict between current medical practice and
present law is to be eliminated. A reformulation of the standards for
determining death should thus be undertaken by either courts or
legislatures. There are strengths and weaknesses in both law-creating
mechanisms, but on balance we believe that if legislators approach
the issues with a critical and inquiring attitude, a statutory "definition"
of death may be the best way to resolve the conflicting needs for
definiteness and flexibility, for public involvement and scientific ac-
curacy. 55 Moreover, since pressures for a legislative response to the
problem appear to be mounting, 6 careful examination of the proper
scope and content of such a statute seems to be called for.
53 Id.
54 Completed in July 1968 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and ap-
proved by the American Bar Association in August of that year, the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act was adopted with only minor changes in 40 jurisdictions including the District
of Columbia in 1969; by the end of 1971, the Act had been adopted in the remaining
11 states. For a detailed discussion of the national acceptance of the Act see Sadler,
Sadler & Stason, Transplantation and the Law: Progress Toward Uniformity, 282 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 717 (1970). See also Brickman, Medico-Legal Problems with the Question
of Death, 5 CAFar. W.L. REv. 110, 122 (1968) (urging Commissioners to draft uniform
act on "the procedures for determining death").
55 This is, of course, not to say that a judge faced with a case to decide should hold
back from engaging in the sort of analysis, or reaching the conclusions about a proper
"definition," presented here. As Professor Clarence Morris once observed, the age-old
argument that a legislature has a "superior opportunity" to frame general rules should
not foreclose judicial reform of the law where the legislature has failed to act. A judge
has, after all, "no reliable way of knowing" that legislative action will ever be forth-
coming, and if he acts in a way the legislature finds erroneous, his mistake can be set
right by statute. Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 CoLUrm. L. REv. 476, 482
(1959).
56See note 8 supra. It would certainly be preferable for state legislatures and the
Uniform Act Commissioners to begin work on laws now, rather than risking the enactment
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IV. WHAT C AND SHouLD BE LEGISLATED?
Arguments both for and against the desirability of legislation
"defining" death often fail to distinguish among the several different
subjects that might be touched on by such legislation. As a result, a
mistaken impression may exist that a single statutory model is, and
must be, the object of debate. An appreciation of the multiple mean-
ings of a "definition of death" may help to refine the deliberations.
Death, in the sense the term is of interest here, can be defined
purely formally as the transition, however abrupt or gradual, between
the state of being alive and the state of being dead 7 There are at
least four levels of "definitions" that would give substance to this
formal notion; in principle, each could be the subject of legislation:
(1) the basic concept or idea; (2) general physiological standards;
(3) operational criteria; and (4) specific tests or procedures. 8
The basic concept of death is fundamentally a philosophical mat-
ter. Examples of possible "definitions" of death at this level include
"permanent cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism as
a whole," "departure of the animating or vital principle," or "irrevers-
ible loss of personhood." These abstract definitions offer little concrete
help in the practical task of determining whether a person has died;
but they may very well influence how one goes about devising stan-
dards and criteria.
In setting forth the general physiological standard(s) for rec-
oguizing death, the definition moves to a level which is more medico-
technical, but not wholly so. Philosophical issues persist in the choice
to define death in terms of organ systems, physiological functions, or
recognizable human activities, capacities, and conditions. Examples of
possible general standards include "irreversible cessation of spontane-
ous respiratory and/or circulatory functions," "irreversible loss of
of "emergency legislation hastily contrived in response to public pressure and emotional
reaction to [a] particular medical calamity." Matte, supra note 29, at 332; cf. Woodside,
Organ Transplantation: The Doctor's Dilemma and the Lawyer's Responsibility, 31
Ojio ST. L.J. 66, 96 (1970).
57 For a debate on the underlying issues see Morison, Death: Process or Event?,
173 Sc=Ncn 694 (1970); Kass, Death as an Event: A Commentary on Robert Morison,
173 Sc Elw 698 (1971).
68To our knowledge, this delineation of four levels has not been made elsewhere
in the existing literature on this subject. Therefore, the terms "concept," "standard,"
"criteria," and "tests and procedures" as used here bear no necessary connection to the
ways in which others may use these same terms, and in fact we recognize that in some
areas of discourse, the term "standards" is more, rather than less, operational and con-
crete than "criteria"--just the reverse of our ordering. Our terminology was selected
so that the category we call "criteria" would correspond to the level of specificity at which
the Ad Hoc Harvard Committee framed its proposals, which it called and which are
widely referred to as the "new critera" for determining death. We have attempted to
be consistent in our use of these terms throughout this Article. Nevertheless, our major
purpose here is not to achieve public acceptance of our terms, but to promote aware-
ness of the four different levels of a "definition" of death to which the terms refer.
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spontaneous brain functions," "irreversible loss of the ability to re-
spond or communicate," or some combination of these.
Operational criteria further define what is meant by the general
physiological standards. The absence of cardiac contraction and lack
of movement of the blood are examples of traditional criteria for
"cessation of spontaneous circulatory functions," whereas deep coma,
the absence of reflexes, and the lack of spontaneous muscular move-
ments and spontaneous respiration are among criteria proposed for
"cessation of spontaneous brain functions" by the Harvard Com-
mittee. 9
Fourth, there are the specific tests and procedures to see if the
criteria are fulfilled. Pulse, heart beat, blood pressure, electrocardio-
gram, and examination of blood flow in the retinal vessels are among
the specific tests of cardiac contraction and movement of the blood.
Reaction to painful stimuli, appearance of the pupils and their re-
sponsiveness to light, and observation of movement and breathing
over a specified time period are among specific tests of the "brain
function" criteria enumerated above.
There appears to be general agreement that legislation should not
seek to "define death" at either the most general or the most specific
levels (the first and fourth). In the case of the former, differences of
opinion would seem hard to resolve, and agreement, if it were pos-
sible, would provide little guidance for practice.10 In the case of the
latter, the specific tests and procedures must be kept open to changes
in medical knowledge and technology. Thus, arguments concerning
the advisability and desirability of a statutory definition of death are
usually confined to the two levels we have called "standards" and
"criteria," yet often without any apparent awareness of the distinction
between them. The need for flexibility in the face of medical advance
would appear to be a persuasive argument for not legislating any spe-
cific operational criteria. Moreover, these are almost exclusively tech-
nical matters, best left to the judgment of physicians. Thus, the kind
of "definition" suitable for legislation would be a definition of the
general physiological standard or standards. Such a definition, while
not immutable, could be expected to be useful for a long period of time
and would therefore not require frequent amendment.
There are other matters that could be comprehended in legislation
"defining" death. The statute could specify who (and how many) shall
make the determination. In the absence of a compelling reason to
59 See notes 3, 10 supra.
60 Cf. Robertson, Criteria of Death, 175 ScsNcE 581 (1972) (letter to the editor).
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change past practices, this may continue to be set at "a physician,"6'
usually the doctor attending a dying patient or the one who happens
to be at the scene of an accident. Moreover, the law ought probably
to specify the "time of death." The statute may seek to fix the
precise time when death may be said to have occurred, or it may
merely seek to define a time that is clearly after "the precise moment,"
that is, a time when it is possible to say "the patient is dead," rather
than "the patient has just now died." If the medical procedures used
in determining that death has occurred call for verification of the
findings after a fixed period of time (for example, the Harvard Com-
mittee's recommendation that the tests be repeated after twenty-four
hours), the statute could in principle assign the "moment of death"
to either the time when the criteria were first met or the time of
verification. The former has been the practice with the traditional
criteria for determining death.
62
Finally, legislation could speak to what follows upon the determi-
nation. The statute could be permissive or prescriptive in determining
various possible subsequent events, including especially the pronounce-
ment and recording of the death, and the use of the body for burial or
other purposes. 63 It is our view that these matters are best handled
outside of a statute which has as its purpose to "define death." 64
V. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE FORMULATION
OF A STATUTE
In addition to carefully selecting the proper degree of specificity
for legislation, there are a number of other principles we believe should
guide the drafting of a statute "defining" death. First, the phenomenon
of interest to physicians, legislators, and laymen alike is human death.
Therefore, the statute should concern the death of a human being,
61 Cf. UNiFroam ANATOMICAL GI=T ACT § 7(b).
62 See note 99 infra & accompanying text.
63 If . . . sound procedures for stating death are agreed to and carried out,
then theologians and moralists and every other thoughtful person should agree
with the physicians who hold that it is then permissible to maintain circulation
of blood and supply of oxygen in the corpse of a donor to preserve an organ
until it can be used in transplantation. Whether one gives the body over for
decent burial, performs an autopsy, gives the cadaver for use in medical educa-
tion, or uses it as a "vital organ bank" are all alike procedures governed by
decent respect for the bodies of deceased men and specific regulations that ensure
this. The ventilation and circulation of organs for transplant raises no question
not already raised by these standard procedures. None are life-and-death matters.
P. RASEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 72 (1970).
64Nevertheless, a statutory "definition" of death would most appropriately be
codified with the provisions on the procedures to be followed to certify death, under-
take post-mortem examinations, and so forth. For the reasons given below, the statute
"defining" death ought not to be appended to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act or
other "special purpose" laws, however. See notes 65, 79-80 infra & accompanying text.
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not the death of his cells, tissues or organs, and not the "death" or
cessation of his role as a fully functioning member of his family or
community. This point merits considerable emphasis. There may be
a proper place for a statutory standard for deciding when to turn off
a respirator which is ventilating a patient still clearly alive, or, for
that matter, to cease giving any other form of therapy.65 But it is
crucial to distinguish this question of "when to allow to die?" from the
question with which we are here concerned, namely, "when to declare
dead?" Since very different issues and purposes are involved in these
questions, confusing the one with the other clouds the analysis of
both. The problem of determining when a person is dead is difficult
enough without its being tied to the problem of whether physicians,
or anyone else, may hasten the death of a terminally-ill patient, with
or without his consent or that of his relatives, in order to minimize his
suffering or to conserve scarce medical resources.66 Although the same
set of social and medical conditions may give rise to both problems,
they must be kept separate if they are to be clearly understood.
Distinguishing the question "is he dead?" from the question
"should he be allowed to die?" also assists in preserving continuity
with tradition, a second important principle. By restricting itself to
65 See Potter, The Paradoxical Preservation of a Principle, 13 VmL. L. REV. 784,
791 (1968):
What type of questions are entailed in the debate concerning when a
comatose patient should be declared dead? Medical questions and answers are
only one element of the decisionmaking process. Medical skill may be used to
establish that a patient has now entered and is likely to remain in a certain
condition. But medical personnel along with the other members of the com-
munity must then ask: "What are we to do with patients in this condition?"
The answer to that question does not flow directly from any medical knowledge.
It is a question of social policy which must be decided by the entire community.
Implementation of the communal policy may be left in the hands of physicians,
but they act as agents of the communal conscience.
See generally Note, Death with Dignity: A Recommendation for Statutory Change, 22
U. FtrA. L. REv. 368 (1970); Fletcher, Legal Aspects of the Decision Not to Prolong
Life, 203 JA.MA. 65 (1968); Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling
Patients, 36 FoiWA L. RFv. 695 (1968); Note, The Dying Patient: A Qualified Right
to Refuse Medical Treatment, 7 J. Fam. L. 644 (1967); Elkinton, The Dying Patient,
The Doctor and the Law, 13 Vm. L. REv. 740 (1968); Bibrck, supra note 15, at 488-90.
66The ease with which the two questions can become confused is demonstrated
by the following "general definition of human death" proposed in Halley & Harvey,
Medical vs. Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J.A.M.A. 423, 425 (1968):
Death is irreversible cessation of all of the following: (1) total cerebral
function, (2) spontaneous function of the respiratory system, and (3) spon-
taneous function of the circulatory system.
Special circumstances may, however, justify the pronouncement of death
when consultation consistent with established professional standards have been
obtained and when valid consent to withhold or stop resuscitative measures
has been given by the appropriate relative or legal guardian.
The authors seem to have realized the mistake in making the state of being dead
(rather than the acceptance of imminent death) depend on the "consent" of a relative
or guardian, and this aspect of the "definition of death" is absent from their subsequent
writings. See, e.g., Halley & Harvey, Law-Medicine Comment: The Definitional Dilemma
of Death, 37 3. KAN. B. Ass'WN 179, 185 (1968); cf. D. M Yas, supra note 28, at 135-36
(criticizing Halley and Harvey's second definition for its internal inconsistency).
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the "is he dead?" issue, a revised "definition" permits practices to
move incrementally, not by replacing traditional cardiopulmonary stan-
dards for the determination of death but rather by supplementing
them. These standards are, after all, still adequate in the majority
of cases, and are the ones that both physicians and the public are
in the habit of employing and relying on. The supplementary standards
are needed primarily for those cases in which artificial means of sup-
port of comatose patients render the traditional standards unreliable.
Third, this incremental approach is useful for the additional and
perhaps most central reason that any new means for judging death
should be seen as just that and nothing more-a change in method
dictated by advances in medical practice, but not an alteration of
the meaning of "life" and "death." By indicating that the various
standards for measuring death relate to a single phenomenon legis-
lation can serve to reduce a primary source of public uneasiness on
this subject.67 Once it has been established that certain consequences
-for example, burial, autopsy, transfer of property to the heirs, and
so forth-follow from a determination of death, definite problems
would arise if there were a number of "definitions" according to which
some people could be said to be "more dead" than others.
There are, of course, many instances in which the law has estab-
lished differing definitions of a term, each framed to serve a particular
purpose. One wonders, however, whether it does not appear somewhat
foolish for the law to offer a number of arbitrary definitions of a natu-
ral phenomenon such as death. Nevertheless, legislators might seek to
identify a series of points during the process of dying, each of which
might be labelled "death" for certain purposes. Yet so far as we know,
no arguments have been presented for special purpose standards
except in the area of organ transplantation. Such a separate "definition
of death," aimed at increasing the supply of viable organs, would
permit physicians to declare a patient dead before his condition met
the generally applicable standards for determining death if his organs
are of potential use in transplantation. The adoption of a special stan-
dard risks abuse and confusion, however. The status of prospec-
tive organ donor is an arbitrary one to which a person can be
assigned by relatives68 or physicians and is unrelated to anything about
the extent to which his body's functioning has deteriorated. A special
"definition" of death for transplantation purposes would thus need
67 See notes 15, 16 supra. The way in which cardiopulmonary and brain functions
relate to each other and to the phenomenon of death is explored in note 89 infra.
68 UiNqop ANATOmCiAL Gir ACT § 2(c). For example, if a special standard
were adopted for determining death in potential organ donors, relatives of a dying
patient with limited financial means might feel substantial pressure to give permission for
his organs to be removed in order to bring to a speedier end the care given the patient.
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to be surrounded by a set of procedural safeguards that would govern
not only the method by which a person is to be declared dead but
also those by which he is to be classified as an organ donor.6 9 Even
more troublesome is the confusion over the meaning of death that
would probably be engendered by multiple "definitions. 17 1 Conse-
quently, it would be highly desirable if a statute on death could avoid
the problems with a special "definition." Should the statute happen
to facilitate organ transplantation, either by making more organs
available or by making prospective donors and transplant surgeons
more secure in knowing what the law would permit, so much the bet-
ter.7
1
If, however, more organs are needed for transplantation than can
be legally obtained, the question whether the benefits conferred by
transplantation justify the risks associated with a broader "definition"
of death should be addressed directly72 rather than by attempting to
subsume it under the question "what is death?" Such a direct con-
69 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which establishes procedures for the donation
of organs by an individual or his relatives, appears to operate on the premise that
"death" will be determined by standards which are generally accepted and applied in
the ordinary course of events; it does not undertake to "define" death. But cf. note 100
infra.
70 For instance, suppose that Mr. Smith, a dying patient in University Hospital,
is found to be immunologically well matched with Mr. Jones, a University Hospital
patient awaiting a heart transplant. Under the special transplantation "definition" Smith
is then declared dead, but just as the surgeons are about to remove Smith's heart,
Jones suddenly dies. The doctors then decide that Smith is no longer needed as an
organ donor. His condition does not meet the standards for declaring death in non-
donors. Is Smith "dead" or "alive"?
71 This would be the case if the generally applicable standards for determining
death permit organs to be removed at a time when they are still useable for trans-
plantation purposes. The "definition" suggested by the Article meets this objective, we
believe.
72Much of the public's fear of premature excision arises from the failure to
distinguish the general practitioner's and the transplant surgeon's meaning of the
term 'death'. It would be desirable to distinguish the two formally, and use
different terms.
Hillman & Aldridge, Towards a Legal Definition of Death, 116 SoL. J. 323, 324 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hillman]. These British medical-legal commentators suggest that
"irreversible brain damage," which would include patients with no higher brain activity
but continued spontaneous respiration, be recognized as a ground for removal of organs
prior to ordinary death. They contemplate that certain "essential safeguards" be incorpo-
rated into a statute on "irreversible brain damage" to avoid abuse of this category. Id.
325.
Prior to the first heart transplant in France, a special "definition" was enacted to
remove any uncertainty about the permissibility of removing a beating heart from a
"dead" donor. In April 1968 the government decreed a "definition of clinical death" for
use with organ donors, based on a flat electroencephalogram of ten minutes duration
which was taken to show that an artificially maintained patient lacks "function in the
higher nervous centers." D. ME-_s, supra note 28, at 113. Meyers seems to question this
approach; he believes that the public must be shown
not just that the brain has been irreparably damaged, but also that the extent of
this damage is absolutely inconsistent with continued maintenance of independent
life in the individual. If e!ectro-enphalograph testing can in fact show this, then it
is a valuable definitional tool in ascertaining clinical death; but the medical profes-
sion as yet appears somewhat divided on its reliability. In such circumstances, the
public cannot be expected to accept the evidence of an electro-encephalographic
reading as part of a legislative definition of death.
Id. 135.
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frontation with the issue could lead to a discussion about the standards
and procedures under which organs might be taken from persons
near death, or even those still quite alive, at their own option 3 or
that of relatives, physicians, or representatives of the state. The major
advantage of keeping the issues separate is not, of course, that this
will facilitate transplantation, but that it will remove a present source
of concern: it is unsettling to contemplate that as you lie slowly dying
physicians are free to use a more "lenient" standard to declare you
dead if they want to remove your organs for transplantation into other
patients.
Fourth, the standards for determining death ought not only to
relate to a single phenomenon but should also be applied uniformly
to all persons. A person's wealth or his "social utility" as an organ
donor should not affect the way in which the moment of his death is
determined.
Finally, while there is a need for uniformity of application at any
one time, the fact that changes in medical technology brought about
the present need for "redefinition" argues that the new formulation
should be flexible. As suggested in the previous section, such flexibility
is most easily accomplished if the new "definition" confines itself to
the general standards by which death is to be determined and leaves
to the continuing exercise of judgment by physicians the establishment
and application of appropriate criteria and specific tests for determin-
ing that the standards have been met.
VI. THE KANSAS STATUTE
The first attempt at a legislative resolution of the problems dis-
cussed here was made in 1970 when the State of Kansas adopted
"An Act relating to and defining death."7 4 The Kansas statute has
7 3 See, e.g., Blachly, Can Organ Transplantation Provide an Altruistic-Expiatory
Alternative to Suicide?, 1 Lim-Tm=aTru G BMAVIOR 6 (1971); Scribner, Ethical
Problems of Using Artificial Organs to Sustain Human Life, 10 TRAus. Am. Soc. ARxan.
INTERxAL ORGANS 209, 211 (1964) (advocating legal guidelines to permit voluntary
euthanasia for purpose of donating organs for transplantation).
74 Law of Mar. 17, 1970, ch. 378, E19701 Kan. Laws 994 (codified at KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971)). It provides in full:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of
a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence
of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the disease or
condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because
of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are
considered hopeless; and, in this event, death will have occurred at the time
these functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the
absence of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of
medical practice, during reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spon-
taneous circulatory or respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain
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received a good deal of attention; similar legislation was enacted in
the spring of 1972 in Maryland and is presently under consideration
in a number of other jurisdictions. 7' The Kansas legislation, which
was drafted in response to developments in organ transplantation and
medical support of dying patients, provides "alternative definitions
of death," 70 set forth in two paragraphs. Under the first, a person is
considered "medically and legally dead" if a physician determines
"there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function
and . . . attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless. '7  In the
second "definition," death turns on the absence of spontaneous brain
function if during "reasonable attempts" either to "maintain or restore
spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function," it appears that "fur-
ther attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not
succeed."7 The purpose of the latter "definition" is made clear by
the final sentence of the second paragraph:
Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of support-
ing respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and
before any vital organ is removed for the purpose of trans-
plantation.79
The primary fault with this legislation is that it appears to be
based on, or at least gives voice to, the misconception that there are
two separate phenomena of death. This dichotomy is particularly
unfortunate because it seems to have been inspired by a desire to
establish a special definition for organ transplantation, a definition
which physicians would not, however, have to apply, in the drafts-
function, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive main-
tenance will not succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these
conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means
of supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and before
any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes
in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the
contrary notwithstanding.
75 See note 4 supra. In the Maryland law, which is nearly identical to its Kansas
progenitor, the phrase "in the opinion of a physician" was deleted from the first
paragraph, and the phrase "and because of a known disease or condition" was added
to the second paragraph following "ordinary standards of medical practice." IAiUR1Aism
SEssioNs LAWS ch. 693 (1972). Interestingly, Kansas and Maryland were also among
the first states to adopt the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in 1968, even prior to its
official revision and approval by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
76Note 74 supra.
77Id. In using the term "hopeless," the Kansas legislature apparently intended to
indicate that the "absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function" must be
irreversible before death is pronounced. In addition to being rather roundabout, this
formulation is also confusing in that it might be taken to address the "when to allow
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man's words, "to prove the irrelevant deaths of most persons."8
Although there is nothing in the Act itself to indicate that physicians
will be less concerned with safeguarding the health of potential organ
donors, the purposes for which the Act was passed are not hard to
decipher, and they do little to inspire the average patient with confi-
dence that his welfare (including his not being prematurely declared
dead) is of as great concern to medicine and the State of Kansas as
is the facilitation of organ transplantation. 81 As Professor Kennedy
cogently observes, "public disquiet [over transplantation] is in no
way allayed by the existence in legislative form of what appear to be
alternative definitions of death." 82 One hopes that the form the
statute takes does not reflect a conclusion on the part of the Kansas
legislature that death occurs at two distinct points during the process
of dying. 3 Yet this inference can be derived from the Act, leaving
open the prospect "that X at a certain stage in the process of dying
can be pronounced dead, whereas Y, having arrived at the same point,
is not said to be dead."
8' 4
The Kansas statute appears also to have attempted more than
the "definition" of death, or rather, to have tried to resolve related
questions by erroneously treating them as matters of "definition."
One supporter of the statute praises it, we think mistakenly, for this
reason: "Intentionally, the statute extends to these questions: When
can a physician avoid attempting resuscitation? When can he ter-
minate resuscitative efforts? When can he discontinue artificial main-
80 Taylor, supra note 5, at 296.
81 Cf. Kass, A Caveat on Transplants, The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1968, § B, at 1,
coL 1; Discussion of Murray, Organ Transplantation: The Practical Possibilities, in
MicAL PROGRESS, supra note 1, at 67 (comments of Dr. T. E. Starzl): "[Tlhe new risk
is introduced [by the use of cadaver organs] that the terminal care of such potential
donors may be adversely influenced by the events which are expected to follow after
death, which might conceivably remove whatever small chance there might have been
for survival."
82 Kennedy, supra note 20, at 947.
83 General use of the term "resuscitation" might suggest the existence of a common
notion that a person can die once, be revived (given life again), and then die again at
a later time-in other words, that death can occur at two or more distinct points in
time. But resuscitation only restores life "from apparent death or unconsciousness."
WExBsa's TmRD NEW INTERNATiONAL DicTiroNARY 1937 (1966) (emphasis added). The
proposed statute, text accompanying note 88 infra, takes account of the possibility of
resuscitation by providing that death occurs only when there has been an irreversible
cessation of the relevant vital bodily functions. Cf. 3 M. HouTs & I.H. HAUT, COURT-
ROOM IMDICINE § 1.01 (3) (d) (1971):
The ability to resuscitate patients after apparent death, coupled with ob-
servations that in many cases the restoration was not to a state of conscious-
ness, understanding and intellectual functioning, but merely to a decerebrate,
vegetative existence, and with advances in neurology that have brought greater,
though far from complete, understanding of the functions of the nervous system,
has drawn attention to the role of the nervous system in maintaining life.
8 4 Kennedy, supra note 20, at 948.
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tenance?" 85 To be sure, "when the patient is dead" is one obvious
answer to these questions, but by no means the only one. As indicated
above, we believe that the question "when is the patient dead?" needs
to be distinguished and treated separately from the questions "when
may the doctor turn off the respirator?" or "when may a patient
-dying yet still alive-be allowed to die?"
VII. A STATUTORY PROPOSAL
As an alternative to the Kansas statute we propose the following:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medi-
cal practice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of
spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the
event that artificial means of support preclude a determi-
nation that these functions have ceased, a person will be
considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician,
based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has ex-
perienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain
functions. Death will have occurred at the time when the
relevant functions ceased.
This proposed statute provides a "definition" of death confined
to the level of general physiological standards, and it has been drafted
in accord with the five principles set forth above in section V. First,
the proposal speaks in terms of the death of a person. The determina-
tion that a person has died is to be based on an evaluation of certain
vital bodily functions, the permanent absence of which indicates that
he is no longer a living human being. By concentrating on the death of
a human being as a whole, the statute rightly disregards the fact that
some cells or organs may continue to "live" after this point,"" just as
others may have ceased functioning long before the determination of
death. This statute would leave for resolution by other means the
question of when the absence or deterioration of certain capacities,
such as the ability to communicate, or functions, such as the cerebral,
indicates that a person may or should be allowed to die without further
medical intervention.
Second, the proposed legislation is predicated upon the single
phenomenon of death. Moreover, it applies uniformly to all persons,87
85 11]s, The Kansas Death Statute: Bold and Innovative, 285 NEw ENG. J. AE.
968 (1971).
86 Cf. F. MooRE, TRANSPLANT 27-36 (1972).
87 Differences in the exact mode of diagnosing death will naturally occur as a result
of differing circumstances under which the physician's examination is made. Thus, the
techniques employed with an automobile accident victim lying on the roadside at
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by specifying the circumstances under which each of the standards
is to be used rather than leaving this to the unguided discretion of
physicians. Unlike the Kansas law, the model statute does not leave
to arbitrary decision a choice between two apparently equal yet dif-
ferent "alternative definitions of death."" Rather, its second stan-
dard is applicable only when "artificial means of support preclude"
use of the first. It does not establish a separate kind of death, called
"brain death." In other words, the proposed law would provide two
standards gauged by different functions, for measuring different
manifestations of the same phenomenon. If cardiac and pulmonary
functions have ceased, brain functions cannot continue; if there is
no brain activity and respiration has to be maintained artificially,
the same state (i.e., death) exists. 9 Some people might prefer a single
standard, one based either on cardiopulmonary or brain functions.
This would have the advantage of removing the last trace of the "two
night may be less sophisticated than those used with a patient who has been receiving
treatment in a well-equipped hospital.
88KAN. STAT. AN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971).
89 [Llife is supported by the smooth and integrated function of three principal
systems: circulatory, respiratory and nervous . . . .So long as the integrated
function of these three systems continues, the individual lives. If any one of
them ceases to function, failure of the other two will shortly follow, and the
organism dies. In any case it is anoxia, or deprivation of oxygen, that is the
ultimate cause of death of cells: in central nervous system failure, because the
impulses which maintain respiration cease; in cardiac failure, because oxygenated
blood is not moved to the cells; and in respiratory failure, because the blood,
although circulating, is not releasing carbon dioxide nor replenishing oxygen in
the lungs. Although other organs, such as the liver and kidneys, perform func-
tions essential to life, their failure does not per se result in immediate death; it
results, rather, in the eventual failure of one of the three systems described,
and is thus only an indirect cause of death.
3 M. HouTs & I.H. HAuT, CouRTRooar MEDIcINE § 1.01(2) (a) (1971).
It has long been known that, even when a patient loses consciousness and becomes
areflexive, he may recover if heartbeat and breathing continue, but if they do not there
is no hope of recovery. Thus, death came to be equated with the absence of these two
"vital signs," although what was being detected was really the permanent cessation
of the integrated functioning of the circulatory, respiratory, and nervous systems.
In recent years, the traditional concept of death has been departed from, or at least
severely strained, in the case of persons who were dead according to the rationale
underlying the traditional standards in that they had experienced a period of anoxia
long enough to destroy their brain functions, but in whom respiration and circulation
were artificially re-created. By recognizing that such artificial means of support may
preclude reliance on the traditional standards of circulation and respiration, the statute
proposed here merely permits the logic behind the long-existing understanding (i.e.,
integrated trisystemic functioning) to be served; it does not create any "new" type
of death. Practically, of course, it accomplishes this end by articulating the "new"
standard of "irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions," as another means
of measuring the existing understanding. Dr. jean Hamburger has observed, "After the
guillotine has cut off a criminal's head, it is possible now to keep the heart and lungs
going on for days. Do you think that such a person is dead or alive?" Discussion of
Louisell, Transplantation: Existing Legal Constraints, in MEDICAL PROrRass, supra note 1,
at 100. The purpose of the "new" standard is to make it clear that the answer to
Hamburger's question is unequivocably that the person is dead. Cf. Gray v. Sawyer,
247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952) (newly discovered evidence that blood was gushing from
decedent's decapitated body is significant proof that she was still alive following an
accident) ; Bi6rck, supra note 15, at 485; Note, supra note 1, at 206.
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deaths" image, which any reference to alternative standards may still
leave. Respiratory and circulatory indicators, once the only touchstone,
are no longer adequate in some situations. It would be possible,
however, to adopt the alternative, namely that death is always to be
established by assessing spontaneous brain functions. Reliance only
on brain activity, however, would represent a sharp and unnecessary
break with tradition. Departing from continuity with tradition is not
only theoretically unfortunate in that it violates another principle of
good legislation suggested previously, but also practically very difficult,
since most physicians customarily employ cardiopulmonary tests for
death and would be slow to change, especially when the old tests are
easier to perform, 0 more accessible and acceptable to the lay public,
and perfectly adequate for determining death in most instances.
Finally, by adopting standards for death in terms of the cessation
of certain vital bodily functions but not in terms of the specific criteria
or tests by which these functions are to be measured, the statute does
not prevent physicians from adapting their procedures to changes in
medical technology. 1
A basic substantive issue remains: what are the merits of the
proposed standards? For ordinary situations, the appropriateness of
the traditional standard, "an irreversible cessation of spontaneous
respiratory and circulatory functions,"92 does not require elaboration.
Indeed, examination by a physician may be more a formal than a real
requirement in determining that most people have died. In addition
9oThe clinical signs of irreversible loss of brain functions are probably not a great
deal more difficult to elicit than the traditional signs of death are to detect, although
the former are less accessible since they require active intervention to be educed and
are not susceptible of mere observation. Aside from the taking of an electroencephalogram,
the tests involved (such as tickling the cornea, irrigating the ear with ice water, and
tapping the tendons with a reflex hammer) are fairly simple, but unlike the customary
tests (such as listening for heartbeat with a stethoscope, seeing if a mirror held by the
nose and mouth is clouded by breathing, and measuring pulse), they require equipment
which a physician may be less likely to have at hand.
91For example, it remains to be determined whether an electroencephalographic
reading is necessary for an accurate diagnosis, as many now hold, or whether it should
be regarded as having only "confirmatory value," as urged by the Harvard Committee.
See note 11 supra.
92 This language, taken from the proposed statute, is intended as a succinct summay
of the standard now employed in ordinary circumstances. Of course, the requirement
that the cessation of these functions be irreversible cannot be emphasized too strongly.
A physician may be needed to make this determination in some cases-and to apply
the means necessary to reverse a temporary cessation caused by a heart attack or the
like. But laymen are also aware of the significance of the requirement as is indicated
by the common practice of giving "first aid," in the form of artificial respiration, to
restore breathing in victims of mishaps, particularly drowning, electric shock, and
poisoning.
Two British commentators suggest that legislation "defining" death also prescribe
the resuscitative efforts required to be made before death may be declared. HilIman,
supra note 72, at 325. We believe it is enough to demand "irreversibility," as a conse-
quence of which whatever attempts at resuscitation are established by current standards
of good medical practice would be compelled.
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to any obvious injuries, elementary signs of death such as absence of
heartbeat and breathing, cold skin, fixed pupils, and so forth, are
usually sufficient to indicate even to a layman that the accident victim,
the elderly person who passes away quietly in the night, or the patient
stricken with a sudden infarct has died. 3 The difficulties arise when
modern medicine intervenes to sustain a patient's respiration and
circulation. As we noted in discussing the Harvard Committee's con-
clusions, the indicators of brain damage appear reliable, in that studies
have shown that patients who fit the Harvard criteria have suffered
such extensive damage that they do not recover.94 Of course, the task
of the neurosurgeon or physician is simplified in the common case
where an accident victim has suffered such gross, apparent injuries
to the head that it is not necessary to apply the Harvard criteria in
order to establish cessation of brain functioning.
The statutory standard, "irreversible cessation of spontaneous
brain functions," is intended to encompass both higher brain activities
and those of the brainstem. There must, of course, also be no spontane-
ous respiration; the second standard is applied only when breathing
is being artificially maintained. The major emphasis placed on brain
functioning, although generally consistent with the common view of
what makes man distinctive as a living creature, brings to the fore a
basic issue: What aspects of brain function should be decisive? The
question has been refrained by some clinicians in light of their ex-
perience with patients who have undergone what they term "neocorti-
cal death" (that is, complete destruction of higher brain capacity,
demonstrated by a flat E.E.G.). "Once neocortical death has been
unequivocally established and the possibility of any recovery of con-
sciousness and intellectual activity [is] thereby excluded, . . . al-
93 The statute provides that the determination of death depends on "the announced
opinion of a physician." This raises two distinct sorts of questions. First, which phy-
sician's opinion is decisive? As previously observed, text accompanying note 64 supra,
under "ordinary standards of medical practice" the physician declaring death would be
the patient's own attending physician; this is particularly true of a patient who is
receiving cardiopulmonary support in a hospital. Since, however, circumstances such
as an automobile accident may arise in which death will have to be determined by
a physician who had not previously attended the decedent, it was thought best to
cast the language in terms of "a physician."
Second, questions may arise concerning the determination of death by nonphy-
sicians. In an emergency, laymen may sometimes have to decide whether death has oc-
curred, and to act on that determination, as in deciding whether to attempt to rescue
someone who may or may not have already died. The proposed statute does nothing to
change that practice or to alter any liability that might result under such circum-
stances, but merely specifies that an official determination must rest on "the opinion
of a physician." This is consistent with existing state laws on the procedures by which
death is "certified." These provisions, as well as ordinary medical practices, make it
unfiecessary to spell out in the model statute the exact manner in which the physician's
opinion should be recorded or certified in the medical files or official documents.
94 See note 12 supra & accompanying text.
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though [the] patient breathes spontaneously, is he or she alive?"",
While patients with irreversible brain damage from cardiac arrest
seldom survive more than a few days, cases have recently been reported
of survival for up to two and one-quarter years. 6 Nevertheless,
though existence in this state falls far short of a full human life, the
very fact of spontaneous respiration, as well as coordinated movements
and reflex activities at the brainstem and spinal cord levels, would
exclude these patients from the scope of the statutory standards.97
The condition of "neocortical death" may well be a proper justification
for interrupting all forms of treatment and allowing these patients to
die, but this moral and legal problem cannot and should not be settled
by "defining" these people "dead."
The legislation suggested here departs from the Kansas statute
in its basic approach to the problem of "defining" death: the proposed
statute does not set about to establish a special category of "brain
death" to be used by transplanters. Further, there are a number of
particular points of difference between them. For example, the pro-
posed statute does not speak of persons being "medically and legally
dead," thus avoiding redundancy and, more importantly, the mistaken
implication that the "medical" and "legal" definitions could differ.98
9 5 Brierley, Adams, Graham & Simpsom, Neocortical Death After Cardiac Arrest, 2
LANcET 560, 565 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brierley]. In addition to a flat (isoelectric)
electroencephalogram, a "neuropathological examination of a biopsy specimen ... from
the posterior half of a cerebral hemisphere" provides further confirmation. Id. The
editors of a leading medical journal question "whether a state of cortical death can be
diagnosed clinically." Editorial, Death of a Human Being, 2 LANcET 590 (1971). Cf. note
14 supra.
96 Brierley and his colleagues report two cases of their own in which the patients
each survived in a comatose condition for five months after suffering cardiac arrest
before dying of pulmonary complications. They also mention two unreported cases of
a Doctor Lewis, in one of which the patient survived for 21/4 years. Brierley, supra
note 95, at 565.
97The exclusion of patients without neocortical function from the category of
death may appear somewhat arbitrary in light of our disinclination to engage in a
philosophical discussion of the basic concepts of human "life" and "death?' See text
accompanying notes 57-60 supra. Were the "definition" contained in the proposed statute
a departure from what has traditionally been meant by "death," such a conceptual
discussion would clearly be in order. But, as this Article has tried to demonstrate, our
intention has been more modest: to provide a clear restatement of the traditional
understanding in terms which are useful in light of modern medical capabilities and
practices. See note 89 supra.
A philosophical examination of the essential attributes of being "human" might lead
one to conclude that persons who, for example, lack the mental capacity to communicate
in any meaningful way, should be regarded as "not human" or "dead." It would
nevertheless probably be necessary and prudent to treat the determination of that kind
of "death" under special procedures until such time as medicine is able routinely to
diagnose the extent and irreversibility of the loss of the "central human capacities"
(however defined) with the same degree of assurance now possible in determining that
death has occurred. Consequently, even at the conceptual level, we are inclined to
think that it is best to distinguish the question "is he dead?" from such questions as
"should he be allowed to die?" and "should his death be actively promoted?"
9 8 The use of the word "legally" (as in "a person will be considered legally dead")
in a law defining death is redundant. Besides, if there were a distinction between a
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Also, the proposed legislation does not include the provision that
"death is to be pronounced before" the machine is turned off or any
organs removed. Such a modus operandi, which was incorporated by
Kansas from the Harvard Committee's report, may be advisable for
physicians on public relations grounds, but it has no place in a statute
"defining" death. The proposed statute already provides that "Death
will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased." 9
If supportive aids, or organs, are withdrawn after this time, such acts
cannot be implicated as having caused death. The manner in which,
or exact time at which, the physician should articulate his finding
is a matter best left to the exigencies of the situation, to local medical
customs or hospital rules, or to statutes on the procedures for certify-
ing death or on transplantation if the latter is the procedure which
raises the greatest concern of medical impropriety. The real safeguard
against doctors killing patients is not to be found in a statute "defin-
ing" death. Rather, it inheres in physicians' ethical and religious
beliefs, which are also embodied in the fundamental professional ethic
of primum non nocere and are reinforced by homicide and "wrongful
death" laws and the rules governing medical negligence applicable in
license revocation proceedings or in private actions for damages.
The proposed statute shares with the Kansas legislation two fea-
tures of which Professor Kennedy is critical. First, it does not require
that two physicians participate in determining death, as recommended
by most groups which set forth suggestions about transplantation.
The reasons for the absence of such a provision should be obvious.
Since the statute deals with death in general and not with death in
relation to transplantation, there is no reason for it to establish a
general rule which is required only in that unusual situation. If par-
ticular dangers lurk in the transplantation setting, they should be dealt
with in legislation on that subject, such as the Uniform Anatomical
"medical" and a "legal" standard of death, a statute could only legislate the legal standard.
Consequently, the adjectives "medical" and "legal" are unnecessary as well as potentially
misleading. Cf. Halley & Harvey, Medical vs. Legal Definition of Death, 204 J.AMA.
423 (1968).
99 It is necessary to state a standard for judging when death occurred for disputes,
typically concerning inheritance or rights of survivorship, in which the exact time of
death is a decisive factor. The proposed statute, in accordance with existing practice,
see text accompanying note 62 supra, fixes the time of death as the point at which the
person actually dies, not the point at which the diagnosis is confirmed. This approach
conforms to the commonsense understanding that both a man who dies in a coal mine
and cannot be found for 24 hours and one who dies in a hospital where the practice is
to require confirmation of the diagnosis by repeating the tests after 24 hours have been
dead for a day before their deaths can be pronounced with certainty. The statutory
phrase "relevant functions" refers to whichever functions are being measured: cardio-
pulmonary functions in the usual case, or brain functions where the others are obscured
by the artificial means being employed.
1972] STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING HUMAN DEATH 117
Gift Act.'00 If all current means of determining "irreversible cessation
of spontaneous brain functions" are inherently so questionable that
they should be double-checked by a second (or third, fourth, etc.)
physician to be trustworthy, or if a certain means of measuring brain
function requires as a technical matter the cooperation of two, or
twenty, physicians, then the participation of the requisite number
of experts would be part of the "ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice" that circumscribe the proper, non-negligent use of such procedures.
It would be unfortunate, however, to introduce such a requirement
into legislation which sets forth the general standards for determining
who is dead, especially when it is done in such a way as to differentiate
between one standard and another.
Kennedy's second objection, that a death statute ought to pro-
vide "for the separation and insulation of the physician (or physicians)
attending the patient donor and certifying death, from the recipient
of any organ that may be salvaged from the cadaver," is likewise
unnecessary. 10 1 As was noted previously, language that relates only
to transplantation has no place in a statute on the determination of
death.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Changes in medical knowledge and procedures have created an
apparent need for a clear and acceptable revision of the standards
for determining that a person has died. Some commentators have
argued that the formulation of such standards should be left to phy-
sicians. The reasons for rejecting this argument seem compelling: the
"1definition of death" is not merely a matter for technical expertise,
the uncertainty of the present law is unhealthy for society and phy-
sicians alike, there is a great potential for mischief and harm through
the possibility of conflict between the standards applied by some
physicians and those assumed to be applicable by the community at
100 In fact, § 7(b) of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act calls only for one physician:
"The time of death [of a donor] shall be determined by a physician who attends the
donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death."
In Tucker v. Lower (see notes 42-50 supra & accompanying text) the defendants
argued that this provision amounted to a "definition" of death (death is when a
physician says you're dead), although Virginia had not adopted the Act until 1970, two
years after the transplantation of the plantiff's brother's heart. The court rejected this
argument since "neither the decedent nor anyone acting on his behalf had made a gift
of any part of his body" and the Act was therefore inapplicable. The reasons for rejecting
the defendant's suggestion seem to us to go deeper; they have been presented throughout
this Article and are summarized in the concluding section.
101 Kennedy, supra note 20, at 949. Again, § 7(b) of the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act covers this point adequately: "The physician [who declares death] shall not par-
ticipate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part."
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large and its legal system, and patients and their relatives are made
uneasy by physicians apparently being free to shift around the mean-
ing of death without any societal guidance. Accordingly, we conclude
the public has a legitimate role to play in the formulation and adoption
of such standards. This Article has proposed a model statute which
bases a determination of death primarily on the traditional standard
of final respiratory and circulatory cessation; where the artificial
maintenance of these functions precludes the use of such a standard,
the statute authorizes that death be determined on the basis of ir-
reversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions. We believe the
legislation proposed would dispel public confusion and concern and
protect physicians and patients, while avoiding the creation of "two
types of death," for which the statute on this subject first adopted in
Kansas has been justly criticized. The proposal is offered not as the
ultimate solution to the problem, but as a catalyst for what we hope
will be a robust and well-informed public debate over a new "defini-
tion." Finally, the proposed statute leaves for future resolution the
even more difficult problems concerning the conditions and procedures
under which a decision may be reached to cease treating a terminal
patient who does not meet the standards set forth in the statutory
"definition of death."
